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Video Conferencing vs. Transfer Petition – Which One Wins in Your Matrimonial Case? (2026)

Video Conferencing vs Transfer Petition in matrimonial cases, featuring Indian court, virtual hearing on laptop, and legal files representing transfer petition process

The Supreme Court has provided an answer — and it might shock you. The entire, updated legal position on whether or not video conferencing can substitute for a transfer petition in a matrimonial dispute is as follows.

SHORT ANSWER

  • According to the Supreme Court's current binding authority (Santhini v. Vijaya Venkatesh (2017), 3-judge bench)), there is no authority for video conferencing to be permitted by the court in a transfer petition. The petitioner has the right to seek a transfer, and that cannot be eliminated merely because VC technology exists.
  • Video conferencing is available at Family Court level — but only after all settlement attempts have failed and then both parties must file a written joint consent for VC. Neither party can force the other to use VC.
  • During 2024-25, courts are employing VC in a practical way for mediation, interim hearings and mention stages — but Santhini remains the law with respect to transfer petitions.
  • If you are opposing a transfer petition, simply arguing "VC is available" will not be sufficient. If you are filing a transfer petition, you have a legal right to be present in person.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Your spouse has initiated proceedings for divorce against you in a jurisdiction 1,400 km from your residence. You are parents who have children, employed, and unable to attend multiple court hearings. You go to the Supreme Court with a transfer petition. The other side’s advocate states, "My Lord, there is no basis upon which to consider your request for may be properly argued. These days we all use video conferencing; therefore the parties can attend via video conferencing; thus the transfer application should be dismissed."

The Supreme Court has received numerous arguments pertaining to the same issue. There has been a well-established and historical legal resolution which has developed through the legal system’s struggles with competing goals of justice that resulted in a significant change through litigation in specific matrimonial matters finally reported to the Supreme Court through a three-judge bench. If you are facing a matrimonial dispute today, you should know what your legal position is — not what it was five years ago, or what your lawyer believed at the time, but what the law currently states — the current and definitive legal position that has been verified by the Courts and constitutes binding authority.

This article sets out to provide you that answer.

The Supreme Court bench was busy during the month of March 2017. It was inundated with transfer petition applications in marriage cases. In particular, there were a large number of transfer petitions filed because one of the parties (usually the wife) could not reach court due to several miles away from their home and even if they did reach there, the trip caused them to deal with more hardships than why they filed the transfer petition before the court in the first place.

By a ruling made in Krishna Veni Nagam v. Harish Nagam [Transfer Petition (Civil) No. 1912 of 2014, decided on 9 March 2017], a division bench of Honourable Justice U.U. Lalit and Honourable Justice Adarsh Kumar Goel issued several reasonable guidelines outlining how matrimonial cases filed in a court located outside the respondent's place of residence will be permitted to transfer from one court to another before either party seeks to file a transfer application in the Supreme Court for the transfer of the case.

Krishna Veni Nagam established four requirements that must be fulfilled before a transfer application can be filed with the Supreme Court due to an out-of-jurisdiction court filing.

Four requirements set out in Krishna Veni Nagam:

(i) Video-conference facilities must be available at the court

(ii) Legal Aid must be available to assist the out-of-town party

(iii) The petitioner must deposit costs of travel, lodging, and food as required by Order XXV, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure

(iv) The out-of-town party must be able to communicate via telephone and email with the other party.

The goal is for the parties to be able to reduce their costs and the workload of the courts while decreasing the number of transfer applications being filed and permitting the courts using modern technology to administer justice. For some time following the ruling, lower courts and even the Supreme Court of India have begun directing that transfer applications be dismissed while directing the parties to make use of video conference facilities for their hearings, thereby offsetting the Supreme Courts of India successes and the costs associated with transfer applications on behalf of the parties.

The Krishna Veni Nagam guidelines were applied to all cases during implementation without any exceptions. Simply because a facility for video conferencing was available in some locations, transfer applications were being denied even if a remote area did not have the Technological and/or practicable ability to access video conferencing as a means of proving the in-camera nature of matrimonial proceedings or how sensitive the reconciliation process is.

A two-member Bench of the Supreme Court subsequently heard an application made by a women to have her matrimonial trial transferred from a Family Court at Alappuzha Kerala to a Family Court in Chennai, Tamil Nadu where it felt uncomfortable applying the Krishna Veni Nagam Directions, and hence referred the matter to be reconsidered by a larger (3-member) Bench.

The larger Bench consisted of the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India Dipak Misra and Hon’ble Justices A.M. Khanwilkar and D.Y. Chandrachud and provided the leading judgment on this issue through its ruling in Santhini v. Vijaya Venkatesh delivered on the 9th October 2017

Santhini v Vijaya Venkatesh's Majority judgement (2017), issued by CJ Dipak Misra and J. A.M. Khanwilkar, set out 4 final rules governing law at this time, and overturned the previous direction in Krishna Veni Nagam:

RULE 1 - PROCEEDINGS CARRIED OUT IN PRIVATE

The Family Courts Act, 1984 enables matrimonial proceedings to be held privately as to save the parties involved the embarrassment and stigma. To use video conferencing for these proceedings, as video can be stored and become evidence of the court, prevents the parties from maintaining privacy and dignity, particularly during the stages of confirming reconciliation and/or settling.

RULE 2 - VIDEO CONFERENCING IS PERMITTED ONLY WITH MUTUAL CONSENT

If settlement negotiations do not produce results, and the parties make a Joint Application to the Court to direct them to Video Conference their Hearing, the Court may allow the use of Video Conferencing; however, the keyword is mutual - One party will not be able to unilaterally direct that the other party use video conferencing to participate in the hearing.

RULE 3 - VIDEO CONFERENCING CANNOT BE DIRECTED TO BE USED FOR A TRANSFER PETITION

This rule provides the most clarity to the litigants involved: video conferencing is unavailable to parties involved in a transfer petition; video conferencing creates the same privacy and dignity issues as described above. The Supreme Court cannot just transfer a matrimonial case from one jurisdiction to another solely on the basis that the petition will be decided using ‘video conferencing’. It can only either grant or dismiss the petition on its merits; it cannot grant the petition by way of a direction to use ‘video conferencing’ as a substitute.

RULE 4 — WOMAN’S STATUTORY RIGHT CANNOT BE NULLIFIED BY TECHNOLOGY

The Supreme Court found that, as a rule, the statutory rights of women in matrimonial disputes cannot be removed by using technology to facilitate video conferencing as an alternative to conducting hearings in person. Protecting women’s dignity also entails respecting their choice of how they would like to participate in proceedings, consistent with Article 15(3) of the Constitution.

Thus, the Supreme Court of India had to decide that the ruling made in Krishna Veni Nagam v Harish Nagam whereby it allowed the making of an application for the transfer of matrimonial cases to be heard by way of video conferencing was no longer applicable. Subject to the provisions of the ‘retrospective effect’, the new legal position resulting from the case of Santhini v Vijaya Kumar from 9 October 2017 is to be applied in place of that set out in Krishna Veni Nagam prior to that date.

In dissenting from the majority’s ruling in Santhini, Justice Chandrachud (now the Chief Justice of India) put forward a minority view that is significant not because it represents the current state of law but because it provides an argument that those opposed to transfer petitions are likely to raise again in the future, and that the courts may eventually revisit.

Justice Chandrachud was of the opinion that the use of modern-day video-conferencing technology does not infringe on the concept of in-camera proceedings - that is, the idea behind conducting a trial ‘in camera’ or behind closed doors is to cease the open presence of all members of the public, not to eliminate the ability of the courts to make use of modern technology. He believed that imposing an unwavering requirement to physically attend court can create imbalances of power within a country as large and diverse as India; the spouse who is less financially secure or more isolated, or who is disadvantaged due to geography, will, in most instances, be physically unable to secure their spouse’s attendance at court; he expressed the view that appropriate structured video-conferencing can provide equal opportunities for all individuals seeking access to the courts and provide justice.

In the years following the pandemic (2020 - 2022), working with courts through video conferencing has established remote participation in three different ways, two of which could not have been predicted based on previous practice at (2017). The argument that "Video conferencing violates privacy and the in-camera nature of proceedings" has been made more of a challenge to prove, as Courts themselves have been using Video Conferencing to conduct proceedings for a number of years.

In a practical sense, while the Santhini case remains binding authority, the increased use of technology in the post-pandemic era means that in 2024 and 2025 Courts are applying that Santhini case with a greater level of sophistication – using Video Conferencing for procedural and interim matters, while also limiting the impact of the Santhini principle at the hearing of substantive matters. No Court has formally overruled Santhini, and thus the core principle, as it relates to transfer petitions, has continued to exist.a

The Santhini decision establishes that video conferencing cannot be ordered in a transfer petition. However, as a result of the pandemic, courts have now moved beyond simply applying the law and created a more complex relationship with this technology.

Here are some of the ways that courts will determine how to use VC in 2025–26:

VC WILL BE UTILIZED FOR…:

  • Mediation appearances in the Supreme Court — physical and VC attendance are permitted at the discretion of the mediator.
  • Adjournment and miscellaneous mentions and hearings at the Family Court stage.
  • Evidence recording if there is a mutual agreement between the parties to use VC.
  • The case if the petitioner appears to be filing the transfer petition primarily as a means of delaying.
  • International or NRI cases when it is unreasonable or impractical for both parties to travel to attend or meet in person.

VC WILL NOT BE UTILIZED FOR…

  • To replace the right of a party to request that a transfer be granted under Section 25 of the CPC.
  • To conduct reconciliation and settlement discussions on matters where emotional connection is important.
  • To conduct final arguments in contested matters at the Family Court.
  • To conduct proceedings where there is an objection by one party and that party has made a good-faith showing of hardship as the basis for the objection to be heard in person.
  • To violate the request of the petitioner to appear in person.

An excellent illustration of the subtlety of the courts in 2026 is visible in the Rinku Baheti v. Sandesh Sharda case (2024 INSC 1014).  In that case, while the Supreme Court permitted mediation to be conducted in part through VC, the Supreme Court made it clear that it would continue to have jurisdiction regarding the substantive merits of the transfer petition.

Rohit Kapoor v. Ketaki Malhotra

Transfer Petition (C) Nos 2674-2675 of 2025; Decided 19 Dec 2025; Justices Sanjay Karol and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh.

In this judgment, issued last month by the Supreme Court, the husband was granted a transfer of the divorce cases from Bhiwadi, Rajasthan to Gurugram, Haryana. Not only was there a physical transfer of the cases, but the Court also directed the parties to attend the transferred proceedings virtually, unless physical attendance was specifically required by the trial court. This is the operational structure of the current model; the Court first decides the merits the transfer petition on the merits of the transfer petition and then provides flexibility of virtual attendance as a matter of convenience (i.e., as a matter of utility) in addition to the right to seek a transfer. The two operate in separate streams, and the Santhini principle was not disturbed.

This decision provides clarity regarding what the Supreme Court is thinking about in 2026: transfer and technology are not mutually exclusive. A case can be transferred to a more convenient court, and once there, VC may be used for routine appearances. The only thing that the law prohibits is the use of the availability of VC to support the denial of the transfer

If Petitioner is filing a transfer petition

Your ability to file a transfer petition in order to pursue a case at a more convenient court is protected by the binding Santhini law. If the Respondent argues that you could simply appear via video conferencing, and thus the request for transfer should not be granted, you can rebut that argument since there is no currently existing statute to support it. Point the Court to Santhini v. Vijaya Venkatesh (2017, three judge panel) and the court's written decision that unequivocally states, “in a request for transfer, there should be no order to proceed through video conferencing.” However, be aware that the continuing authority granted by law in this instance is limited to instances involving genuine, demonstrable financial and/or other hardships incurred as a result of prosecuting in the original jurisdiction. Therefore, the Court will not grant a transfer if you can demonstrate that the request for transfer was made solely to inconvenience the Respondent.

Don’t construct your primary defence to oppose a transfer on the basis of video conference. That argument has been specifically rejected by the three judges in T. Moore v. McCullough, 21 M.J. 249 (Alberta Court of Queen's Bench). The best arguments you have are (a) The petitioner has been able to appear multiple times and thus is not demonstrating a hardship; (b) The balance of convenience actually favours the original Court; (c) The transfer will create a hardship for you, equal to or greater than that of the petitioner; (d) There are connected courts, or evidence located in the original Court and (e) The petitioner has the financial and logistical capacity to bring themselves to Court – as demonstrated through cases such as Gargi Konar v. Jagjeet Singh (2005) 11 SCC 446 and Delma Lubna Coelho v. Edmond Clint Fernandes (2023).

The very short summary of both sides to the matter: Video conferencing is an adjunct court tool and is used by Courts for convenience only to facilitate routine hearings and post-settlement hearing proceedings – it is not a legal basis for denying the other party's petition to transfer venue, and never can substitute or diminish the right to attend Court proceedings at a Court with proper accessibility.

Below are some examples of situations where a transfer petition has been denied due to reasons other than the VC.

In Gargi Konar v. Jagjeet Singh, (2005) 11 SCC 446, the wife requested a transfer from Bhatinda Punjab to Burdwan West Bengal on the ground that she could not afford to travel because her father was financially supporting her. The Court found that the husband will pay the wife's travel expenses and the cost of a person accompanying her. Therefore, the husband can significantly mitigate any claimed hardship without transferring the petitioner.

In Delma Lubna Coelho v. Edmond Clint Fernandes, the wife, a Canadian permanent resident (PR), moved the Supreme Court to have her and her husband's divorce proceedings moved to Mumbai from Canada due to the inability to travel outside Canada from where she lived. The Court found evidence of the wife's PR status, her participating in mediating with the husband via video-conferencing, and her ability to travel and financially support herself. Therefore, the Court dismissed the wife's petition for a transfer — regardless, of the VC status. These cases illustrate that when a petitioner's own actions demonstrate that they have suffered minimal hardship as opposed to the hardship the petitioner sought transfer from the other jurisdiction, the petition for a transfer will fail regardless of whether VC can provide proper evidence of venue convenience.

The case of Anjali Brahmawar Chauhan v. Navin Chauhan involved a request made to the Supreme Court to transfer a divorce petition from Gautam Buddha Nagar in Uttar Pradesh to Delhi because there were no direct trains between the two locales at that time. The court held that transferring a divorce petition would cause too much delay; rather than transferring the case, the recent availability of video conferencing allowed parties to attend hearings remotely.

In addition, although this decision was decided under the old Krishna Veni Nagam framework, which was overruled by Santhini years later yet still applies on a prospective basis only, this case illustrates how factually similar cases were decided prior to Santhini and therefore may be erroneously cited by respondents as either current caselaw or precedential authority. Verify that you have confirmed the timeliness of any citation provided by the opposing party if they reference this case.

1. Citing Krishna Veni Nagam as Current Law

A large number of lawyers and litigants still refer to Krishna Veni Nagam v. Harish Nagam as support for video conferencing replacing transfer. On 9 October 2017, the three-member bench decision issuing Santhini, overruled this decision. Not only is it wrong to cite a decision that has been overruled, but it is a serious error not to notify the court of the overruling, which the court looks at with great scrutiny.

2. Assuming Santhini Automatically Protects all Transfer Petitions

Santhini protects your right to request a transfer; however, it does not guarantee the court will approve your request. You must still provide sufficient grounds. Santhini prohibits the court from dismissing your transfer petition solely because video conferencing is available, but does not prohibit the court from dismissing a transfer petition based upon the merits of the case upon which the transfer petition is based.

3. Confusing VC Rules for Transfer Petitions with VC Rules for Family Court Petition

Santhini creates a clear distinction: a) in transfer petitions to the Supreme Court, a court cannot order/accept VC; and b) in Family Court once a case has been settled and both parties agree to the case settling, the court may allow VC. Many litigants use the same VC rules for Family Court and transfer court by incorrectly using VC arguments both in each case type.

4. Substituting a transfer petition in order to escape appearing by VC instead of having a valid hardship to exist.

Courts take seriously those petitions presented to them which have been filed as a "tactical" means of trying to delay or to "forum shop" as opposed to having a valid hardship preventing an individual from appearing. If it is found that your actual issue is merely that you don’t want to appear with the aid of VC but your actual hardship is very minimal, the Court will make its decision after assessing all of the aspects surrounding your particular situation. Therefore if the court believes that your petition appears to be based on a strategic motive rather than a valid need for relief there will be a greater likelihood of the Court dismissing your petition, even under the decision of Santhini.

5. Not raising any VC-related argument in your petition.

If you have knowledge that the other party will raise the VC issue in response to your transfer petition and you wish to obtain relief from it, then you should preemptively raise the VC argument in your petition. This includes using the Santhini case and stating why VC does not resolve your particular hardship (especially to the extent that there are reconciliation proceedings pending). Overall, a petition which addresses the key argument of the opposing party in advance is typically viewed far more favorably than one that has deficiencies allowing for additional arguments to be made by an opponent

1. Is it possible for a transfer application to be refused solely because they can communicate via video conferencing?

No. The Supreme Court has addressed this issue in Santhini v Vijaya Venkatesh (2017). A three-judge bench ruled very clearly that "video conferencing cannot be ordered in a transfer application.” The availability of video conferencing alone is insufficient to deny a transfer application on its merits. A transfer application should be determined on the basis of convenience, hardship, safety, or the administration of justice rather than based on the availability of some theoretical technology.

2. Is Santhini v. Vijaya Venkatesh still good law as of 2026 or has it been overturned?

Santhini v. Vijaya Venkatesh is still good law as of now (April 2026). It was rendered by a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court, with the principal holding being that VC cannot be coerced in an application to transfer a proceeding from one court to another, and thus this is the current governing precedent. While there is a practical development since COVID-19 that permits the use of VC for routine matters in the courts, no further three-judge or greater bench has issued a ruling reversing Santhini.

3. What is the distinction between Krishna Veni Nagam and Santhini? Which case governs my case?

Krishna Veni Nagam v. Harish Nagam (March 2017) was a decision issued by a two-judge division in which it provided that courts must consider the use of video conferencing as an alternate process to the transfer of cases from one court to another. Santhini v. Vijaya Venkatesh (October 2017) is a three-judge decision that overruled Krishna Veni Nagam on this issue. As Santhini overrules Krishna Veni Nagam as it was rendered by a three-judge division versus a two-judge division, Santhini is governing precedent for all occurrences that transpired after 9 October 2017. Therefore, all parties to a matter filed after that date should cite Santhini as the applicable authority and not Krishna Veni Nagam.

4. Is the court able to require me to appear by way of video conference simply because my spouse has previously done so voluntarily?

No. As indicated in Santhini, at the Family Court level, an application for VC can be made by way of a joint application or an individual consent for VC by either party after being unable to reach a settlement following all attempts to settle the matter. Because the use of VC previously was done on a voluntary basis, you are under no obligation to continue to use VC. If you now wish to attend in person or request that your matter be transferred to a different courtroom because that other location is more accessible, you are entitled to do so; however, your past history may be taken into account by the court when determining whether your present circumstances constitute a legitimate hardship.

5. The opposing party in my case 498A states I can also do my case via video conferencing. Is the ruling made in the case of Santhini applicable to criminal transfer petitions?

Santhini was decided with respect to matrimonial transfer petitions governed by section 25 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), which expressly relates only to the transfer of cases of a civil nature. Criminal transfer petitions for 498A, DV Act and similar matters are covered by section 446 of the BNSS (formerly section 406 of the Criminal Procedure Code). The principles set out in the case of Santhini regarding the in-camera nature of the proceedings and the right to participate physically can also be applicable to criminal matrimonial matters and should be persuasive in nature, however, the legislation and the test to apply will be different. The standard that must be reached in criminal transfer applications is higher than a mere showing of convenience — the applicant must demonstrate that there is a potential for prejudice to a fair trial before a transfer will be ordered. Consult your lawyer with respect to the specifics of your argument for your criminal case.

6. Is it possible for the Supreme Court of India to conduct video conferencing for the purpose of mediating disputes connected with my transfer petition?

Yes. Santhini’s Rule is applicable in allowing use of video conferencing as a mediation tool in connection with the actual transfer petition itself, but does not prohibit the Supreme Court (or the Mediation Centre which functions within the Supreme Court) from using video conferencing to conduct mediation sessions, conduct preliminary hearings, or conduct other procedural processes during the pendency of the transfer petition. The order of the Supreme Court dated December 20, 2025, in the case of Rohit Kapoor vs. Ketaki Malhotra, expressly allows the parties to appear virtually to conduct routine appearances in respect of transferred matters. The use of video conferencing as an accommodation to facilitate the mediation process should not be equated with the use of video conferencing as a basis to deny an order of transfer.

7. I am an NRI. Is it possible for my spouse to argue against transferring my petition through video conferencing (VC)?

This is a complicated situation. In Delma Lubna Coelho (2023), the court ruled that there was no sufficient hardship to support a transfer, with regard to a petitioner status as an NRI, based upon the petitioner's own abilities for international travel, which included participating in VC during mediation. Therefore, your status as an NRI by itself will not help or hinder your petition; it will depend upon whether it is genuinely impractical for you to attend your original court, and whether there is a more appropriate court in India that both parties are able to participate in conveniently. The VC argument can still not defeat your petition pursuant to the decision in Santhini, but all other factors regarding your circumstances will be closely examined.

Adv. Aman Chawla, Matrimonial Law Specialist practising before the Supreme Court of India and Delhi Courts. Based in Delhi. Available for urgent transfer petition matters, opposing petitions, and online consultations across India.

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This article has been written and reviewed by Adv. Aman Chawla,, Supreme Court of India. It is intended for general informational and educational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Laws and judicial interpretations are subject to change. For advice specific to your case, please consult a qualified advocate directly. The Bar Council of India does not permit solicitation or advertisement by advocates — this article is purely for public legal awareness

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