Written by Adv. Aman Chawla | Matrimonial Law Specialist | Delhi High Court & Supreme Court of India 8 Years Exclusive Practice in Family & Matrimonial Law | July 2026

It is one of the most common questions I receive from husbands in maintenance proceedings — and one of the most poorly answered anywhere online.

The husband is a salaried professional. The wife has an MBBS or an LLB or an MBA. She worked for years before marriage, or even during the early years of marriage. Then, at a point that coincidentally aligns with the breakdown of the marriage, she stopped working. Now she is claiming full maintenance, presenting herself as having no income and no ability to support herself.

The husband’s question is simple: “She can work. She chooses not to. Why do I have to pay?”

The legal answer in 2026 is more nuanced than either “yes, always” or “no, never.” Two rulings — one from the Delhi High Court in February and one from the Allahabad High Court in May of this year — have given the clearest judicial answer to this question that Indian courts have produced in recent years, and the answer depends critically on why she is not working.

1. The Basic Legal Rule: Mere Qualification Is Not Enough to Deny

Maintenance

Start with the principle that was reaffirmed by the Delhi High Court in Rakesh Ray v. Priti Ray (2026 SCC OnLine Del 757, February 16, 2026) — delivered by Justice Swarana Kant Sharma, one of the most consistently followed voices on maintenance jurisprudence in Delhi:

“It is now well settled in law that mere capability to earn is not a ground to deny or reduce maintenance.”

This principle comes from the Supreme Court’s own ruling in Shailja & Anr. v. Khobbanna (2018) 12 SCC 199, which the Delhi HC reiterated: the fact that a wife is educated, or was previously employed, or has qualifications that theoretically make her employable, does not automatically mean she should be denied maintenance.

Why? Because the Delhi HC explained the reality that courts must examine:

“The capacity to earn cannot be assessed in isolation from the life circumstances in which the wife presently finds herself. Her prior employment or academic qualifications may indicate her potential, but they do not automatically translate into current employability or financial independence, particularly after years devoted to family care and household responsibilities.”

In Rakesh Ray, the wife had been previously employed but had relocated after marriage, gradually becoming a full-time homemaker. By the time the maintenance dispute arose, years had passed. She was no longer actively employed in her field. She had, in practical terms, lost professional continuity. The Delhi HC held that her prior qualifications could not be used to notionally impute an income she was not actually earning and was not realistically capable of earning at that point in her life.

This is the Rakesh Ray principle: current employability, not theoretical potential, is what courts must assess.

2. The Counterpoint: The May 2026 Allahabad HC Ruling —

Deliberate Non-Employment Is Different

Now read this alongside what the Allahabad High Court held in Dr Garima Dubey v. Dr Saurabh Anand Dubey (2026 SCC OnLine All 3354, May 2026).

The wife in this case was an MD — a gynaecologist. Her professional qualification was current, actively maintained, and in a specialty with consistent, high demand. She was in the prime of her career. She had not relocated to a different city. She had not spent years away from practice. She was, by every observable measure, capable of earning a substantial income from her profession.

She was not working.

The Allahabad High Court held that she was not entitled to maintenance under Section 24 HMA. The Court found that this was a case of deliberate, strategic non-employment — not a situation where life circumstances had genuinely made employment unavailable or impractical. A fully qualified, career-prime gynaecologist is not unable to maintain herself. She was choosing not to. And that choice, the Court held, cannot be placed on the husband as a financial obligation.

“A qualified wife is not entitled to maintenance where she is able to sustain herself.”

3. The Critical Distinction Courts Apply in 2026

Put these two rulings side by side and the picture becomes clear:

DENIED: Deliberate non-employment The wife is qualified, currently employable, in a field with demand, has not experienced any genuine break from practice, and is strategically choosing not to work specifically to maximize the maintenance claim. The Allahabad HC in Dr Garima Dubey addresses this scenario.

GRANTED: Genuine inability despite past qualifications The wife had qualifications and may have worked earlier, but intervening life circumstances — relocation at husband’s request, years as a homemaker, career break for childcare, loss of professional continuity, age or health factors — have made her genuinely unable to return to her prior earning level. The Delhi HC in Rakesh Ray addresses this scenario.

The difference is not about the degree. It is about whether non-employment is a choice driven by litigation strategy or a genuine consequence of marriage and its circumstances.

Courts are increasingly alive to this distinction. They will look at:

• How recently did she leave employment?
• Did she leave before or after the marriage broke down?
• Has she made any attempt to re-enter the workforce?
• Is she registered with professional bodies, maintaining her certifications, attending conferences in her field?
• Is there evidence of her being offered work and declining it?
• Are the circumstances of her life (age, health, childcare obligations, location) consistent with genuine inability?
• Is her claimed inability to work inconsistent with her evident lifestyle and social engagement?

4. The “Notional Income” Principle — What Courts Can Impute

Even where a court finds that a wife is capable of employment, the consequence is not an outright denial of all maintenance. Courts apply the notional income principle: they assess what the wife could reasonably earn in her profession given her specific qualifications, local market, and experience level, and then compute maintenance based on the gap between that notional income and what she needs to maintain the marital standard of living.

The Supreme Court’s framework in Rajnesh v. Neha (2021) 2 SCC 324 — which the Rakesh Ray ruling applies — requires both parties to file detailed income affidavits. The court then:

1. Assesses the husband’s actual income (and lifestyle-based presumed income, per the lifestyle income article)
2. Assesses the wife’s actual income — zero if she is genuinely not working
3. Where she is qualified but not working, assesses her notional earning capacity based on her specific qualifications, experience, and local employment market
4. Computes maintenance by considering both the gap and the marital standard of living

For a husband facing a maintenance claim from a qualified wife who is not working, this notional income calculation is the most powerful argument — not a blanket denial of maintenance, but a substantial reduction based on what she reasonably can earn.

5. The Husband’s Evidence: What You Must Build

If you want to use your wife’s qualifications and deliberate non-employment as a maintenance defence, here is what you need to build factually:

Evidence of her qualifications: Her degree certificates, professional registrations, and any records of her prior employment. This establishes the baseline of what she is capable of.

Evidence that her non-employment is deliberate, not circumstantial: This is the harder — and more important — piece. You need to show that there is no genuine reason she cannot work. Useful evidence includes: her maintaining professional registrations or memberships during the period of non-employment; her attending professional events or continuing education programs that would be unnecessary if she had no intention of practicing; her own communications (messages, emails) in which she discussed career plans inconsistently with the claim of inability to work; evidence that employment in her field is available in the location where she lives; and the absence of any genuine circumstantial factor (health condition, childcare, relocation) that would explain the inability.

Evidence against a genuine circumstantial barrier: If her case is that she gave up her career for the marriage — relocated, had children, became a homemaker — you need evidence that this is an exaggerated or false account. When did she actually stop working? Was it before or after the marriage broke down? Who initiated the arrangement? Is there documentation showing she voluntarily chose to stop, rather than being required to by the circumstances of the marriage?

A realistic notional income assessment: Engage a specialist in your consultation to assess what your wife could realistically earn given her specific qualifications, the current job market in Delhi or the city where she resides, her years of experience, and any gap in practice. This can be placed before the court as evidence of her earning capacity for the notional income calculation.

6. This Applies to Maintenance

Under Multiple Provisions

The qualified-wife maintenance question arises under different legal provisions depending on your specific case:

Section 24 HMA (Interim Maintenance during divorce proceedings): This is what the Dr Garima Dubey ruling (Allahabad HC, May 2026) directly addressed. A qualified wife who is able to sustain herself does not satisfy the “inability to maintain herself” requirement of Section 24. The argument applies here with full force.

Section 125/144 BNSS (General maintenance): The same “sufficient reason” and “inability to maintain” tests apply. A wife who is capable of earning but refuses to work without reason falls into the Section 144(5) disqualification territory — she is “without sufficient reason refusing to live with her husband” and “without sufficient reason refusing to earn.” Courts apply similar scrutiny.

Section 25 HMA (Permanent alimony after decree): The notional income principle applies even here. A qualified wife seeking permanent alimony who is capable of supporting herself will receive a reduced amount — or potentially none — compared to a genuinely dependent wife.

For mutual divorce settlements: where maintenance is being negotiated as part of a mutual settlement, the qualified-wife principle is a significant bargaining factor. Do not agree to a maintenance term as if she were genuinely unable to work if she is not. The settlement reflects what you are willing to pay, not what the law requires.

7. What Has NOT Changed — Where This Defence Fails

Before using this as a defence, understand its limits.

If she left work to care for children: Where the wife stopped working primarily to care for minor children — particularly young children whose care obligations genuinely prevent her from re-entering the workforce — courts are much less sympathetic to the “she’s qualified so she should work” argument. The Supreme Court has consistently held that child-rearing is itself a full-time occupation that justifies maintenance.

If she stopped working at the husband’s request or acquiescence: If the husband encouraged or agreed to the wife stopping work — or if the marriage arrangement was always premised on her being a homemaker — he cannot now use her non-employment as a defence in maintenance proceedings. Courts look at the matrimonial arrangement as it actually existed.

If she genuinely tried and failed to find work: If the wife can show genuine, documented attempts to re-enter her profession that were unsuccessful — applications made, interviews attended, rejections received — that defeats the deliberate non-employment argument significantly.

If her field is genuinely difficult to re-enter: Not all qualifications translate to earnings with equal ease. A Delhi family court judge will not pretend that a law degree from 20 years ago and a 15-year career gap creates the same earning capacity as a practicing advocate. The assessment must be realistic, not theoretical.

Consult Adv. Aman Chawla, Matrimonial Law Specialist, practising before the Supreme Court of India, Delhi High Court, and all Delhi district courts. Available for urgent matters, outstation clients, and online consultations across India.

Call / WhatsApp: +91-8076836899 | Email: advocateamanchawla@gmail.com Office: O-11A Basement, Jangpura Extension, New Delhi – 110014

8. Frequently Asked Questions

Q1. My wife is a doctor but has not worked since we separated. Can I use this to reduce or deny maintenance?

Yes, potentially. The Allahabad High Court’s May 2026 ruling in Dr Garima Dubey v. Dr Saurabh Anand Dubey specifically held that a fully qualified gynaecologist who is able to maintain herself is not entitled to maintenance under Section 24 HMA. The key is establishing that her non-employment is deliberate, not genuinely circumstantial. You need evidence that she is qualified, currently employable, has no genuine barrier to employment, and is choosing not to work for litigation strategic reasons.

Q2. The Supreme Court said “mere capability to earn is not sufficient to deny maintenance.” Doesn’t that protect her claim?

This principle — from Shailja v. Khobbanna (2018) and reaffirmed in Rakesh Ray (Delhi HC, February 2026) — applies where the wife has genuine barriers to employment despite past qualifications: relocation, career gaps due to homemaking, childcare obligations. It does not apply where the wife is currently career-prime, actively employable, with no genuine circumstantial barrier, and is simply choosing not to work. The distinction is between “cannot earn” and “will not earn.”

Q3. She had a job during our marriage but quit when we separated. Is that deliberate non-employment?

It can be, and courts look very closely at the timing. Quitting employment at the same time as or immediately after marital breakdown — particularly where there is no other reason (no relocation, no childcare change, no health issue) — is the pattern courts associate with strategic non-employment. The timing itself is evidence. Preserve any records of when she resigned and what reason she gave her employer.

Q4. What is “notional income” and how does it affect my maintenance payment?

Even where a court finds a wife capable of earning, it typically doesn’t deny all maintenance — it computes what she could realistically earn (her “notional income”) and then calculates maintenance based on the gap between her notional income and the marital standard of living. A qualified wife who is assessed as capable of earning ₹80,000/month in her profession will receive significantly less maintenance than one assessed as having zero earning capacity.

Q5. My wife claims she cannot find a job in Delhi in her field. Does that defeat my argument?

It is a factor courts consider. The notional income must reflect realistic earning potential in the specific location and market, not theoretical global potential. However, where her field has consistent demand in Delhi (medicine, law, finance, engineering), courts are less sympathetic to a claim of inability to find work without documented, genuine attempts. Ask for disclosure of any job applications she has made during the period of non-employment.

Q6. Can I ask the court to order her to find a job?

Indian courts do not issue employment directions in maintenance proceedings. They do, however, assess the wife’s earning capacity and factor it into the maintenance quantum — effectively treating her as if she earned that capacity-based income when computing the amount. The practical effect is that her refusal to work reduces the maintenance burden on you without the court issuing a directive to her.

Q7. She stopped working to care for our children. Does that change the analysis?

Yes, significantly. Where childcare is a genuine, practical barrier to employment — particularly for young children whose care demands cannot be outsourced — courts are far less willing to impute notional income. The age of the children, the availability of daycare or family support, and whether the childcare arrangement preceded or followed the marital breakdown are all relevant factors.

Q8. She is claiming maintenance under both the DV Act and Section 24 HMA simultaneously. Does the qualified-wife defence apply to both?

Yes. The same principles apply across both provisions: a wife’s ability to maintain herself reduces or defeats her maintenance claim, and her deliberate non-employment is not a burden courts will unconditionally place on the husband. The DV Act’s “economic abuse” framework focuses more on the husband’s conduct than on the wife’s earning capacity, so the argument may be somewhat weaker there — but it is still available and should be raised.

Q9. If the court denies her interim maintenance now because she’s qualified, can she apply again later if she still hasn’t found work?

Yes. Maintenance orders can be varied on changed circumstances under both the BNSS and the HMA. If her circumstances genuinely change — she makes documented but unsuccessful attempts to find work, a health issue emerges, childcare needs arise — she can apply for modification. Courts will re-examine the position. Conversely, if she eventually finds work (or if you can show she took up work), you can apply to reduce or terminate maintenance.

Q10. Should I raise this argument early in the maintenance proceedings or wait?

Raise it at the very first opportunity — in your reply to the maintenance petition and in your initial response to any interim maintenance application. Courts pass interim orders quickly, often within a few weeks of filing. If you do not place the notional income and deliberate non-employment arguments on record early, the interim order will be based on the wife’s self-declared zero income, and modifying that later is more work than building the case correctly from the start. Consult your maintenance lawyer before the first date, not after the interim order is already passed.

Written by Adv. Aman Chawla. This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Every case is fact-specific. Please consult a qualified lawyer before taking any legal action.